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South Africa
Interpretation of equality clause in Bill of Rights
by Erika de Wet
S ince April 1994 South Africans have a constitutional right to equality. The interim constitution of 1993, which was in force between April 1994 and December 1996, 
protected this right in s. 8, and the final constitution of 1996, 
which has been in force since January 1997, protects it in s. 9. 
Since the Constitutional Court of South Africa ('the court') 
started its work early in 1995, it has had to interpret the right 
to equality on six different occasions, all relating to the interim 
constitution. In spite of differences in the wording of the 
equality clauses in the respective constitutions, the protection 
provided by them is essentially the same. The decisions 
rendered under the interim constitution therefore laid the 
foundation for the court's future approach to the concept of equality:
This paper will illustrate that the court interprets the right to 
equality in a historical context, restricting the protection 
provided by it to severe forms of unequal treatment, comparable 
to the humiliation suffered by non-white South Africans in the 
past. Although this commentary is limited to four of the 
decisions, this line of argument is present in all six. It is 
submitted that although the court has a special responsibility to 
provide protection against historical patterns of discrimination, 
the right to equality encompasses more than protection against 
these severe forms of unequal treatment. By focusing only on 
the latter, the court runs the risk ol excluding several groups 
from the protection provided by the equality clause. (The two 
decisions not treated are President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1(CC) and City Council of Pretoria v Walker.)
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
Before commenting on the court's decision, it is necessary to 
take note of the relevant subsections of s. 8 and 33 of the 
interim constitution. The latter is the general limitation clause, 
which applies to all the rights in the Bill of Rights (a similar 
clause is contained in s. 36 of the final constitution). 
Section 8 reads as follows: 
'(I)Every person shall have the fight to equality before the law and to
equal protection of the law.
(2) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or 
indirectly, and, without derogating from the generality of this 
provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular: 
race, gender sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, 
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language.
(3) (a) This section shall not preclude measures designed to achieve 
the adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups or 
categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in 
order to enable theirJiill and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms.
(b)...
(4) Prima facie proof of discrimination on any of the grounds specified 
in ss. (2) shall be presumed to be sufficientproof of unfair 
discrimination as contemplated in that subsection, until the 
contrary is established.'
Section 33(1) reads:
'The rights entrenched in this chapter may be limited by law ojgeneral
application, provided that such limitation  
(a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is   
(i) reasonable;
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality; and
(b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in question...' 
Gender discrimination
The first decision in which the court was confronted with a 
possible violation of s. 8 was Brink v KitshofNO 1996 (6) BCLR 
752 (CC). The question was whether s. 44(1) and (2) of the 
Insurance Act 1943 were in conflict with the equality clause. It 
deprived married women of all or some of the benefits of life 
insurance policies ceded to them or made in their favour by 
their husbands, in cases where their husband's estate was 
sequestrated. The Act contained no similar limitation upon the 
effect of a life insurance policy ceded or ellected in favour of a 
husband by a wife. According to the court it was clear that the 
discrimination in s. 44(1) and (2) was sex-related and therefore 
in violation of s. 8(2) of the interim constitution (para. 43). 
Furthermore, this limitation could not be justified in terms of 
the limitation clause in s. 33(1) either (in the final constitution 
the limitation clause is contained in s. 36).
According to the court, the purpose of s. 44(1) and (2) was, 
inter alia, to protect the interests of creditors from possible 
collusion or fraud that could result from the close relationship 
between spouses. However, it was difficult to see how the 
distinction which was drawn between men and women   which 
was the nub of the constitutional complaint   can be reasonable 
or justifiable. No cogent reasons were provided as to why 
s. 44(1) and (2) apply only to transactions in which husbands 
effect policies in favour of or cede them to their wives, and not 
to similar transactions of wives in favour of their husbands. In 
other words, there is no reason why Iraud or collusion does not 
occur when husbands, rather than wives, are the beneficiaries of 
insurance policies. It was also not demonstrated by the
respondent that there were no other legislative provisions which 
could reasonably serve the purpose of protecting the interests of 
creditors in a manner less invasive of constitutional rights 
(para. 48-49).
Although the decision is submitted to be correct, its reasoningo ' o
as to why the equality clause was included in the Bill of Rights is 
subject to criticism. After referring to the systematic patterns of 
discrimination in South Africa's history, the court submitted 
that s. 8 was adopted:
'in the recognition that discrimination against people who are 
members of disfavoured groups can lead to patterns of group 
disadvantage and harm. Such discrimination is unfair. The drafters 
realised that it was necessary both to proscribe such forms of 
discrimination and to permit positive steps to redress the effects of such 
discrimination.' (para.42)
Unfairness to be proved
The court is correct in so far as it recognises that art. 8 
reflects the special responsibility towards those groups subjected 
to discrimination in the past. It is for this reason that s. 8(4) 
creates a presumption of unfairness once discrimination on one 
of the specified grounds in s. 8(2) has been established 
(according to the majority decision in the City Council of Pretoria 
case, this presumption applies to direct as well as indirect 
discrimination on one of the specified grounds). Furthermore, 
s. 8(3) allows for positive measures for the advancement of such 
persons. However, what s. 8 does not do, is to protect only these 
historically disadvantaged groups. Neither does it limit the 
grounds for unfair discrimination to those enumerated in 
s. 8(2), or to those comparable (in their severity) to such 
grounds. The subsection explicitly states that the specified 
grounds contained in it do not derogate from the generality ofo o o J
the equality provision. In other words, all patterns of unequal 
treatment   also those which are less severe than for example 
racial discrimination   could amount to unfair discrimination 
and a subsequent * violation of the equality clause. The only 
difference is that where the discriminatory measures do not 
relate to one of the specified grounds in s. 8(2), the 
presumption of unfairness formulated in s. 8(4) does not apply. 
It would thus be up to those claiming discrimination to prove its 
unfairness.
Paradoxically, the court acknowledges the generality of the 
equality clause. In the Brink case it stated that the list provided 
in s. 8(2) should not be used to derogate from the generality of 
the prohibition of discrimination. However when it comes to 
applying the right to equality to the case at hand, the court time 
and again limits its inquiry to whether those subjected to the 
discriminatory measures would qualify as historically 
'disadvantaged' or 'vulnerable' and whether the discrimination 
would simultaneously result in a violation of human dignity 
comparable to that suffered by disadvantaged groups in the past. 
This became apparent in the decision of Prinsloo v Van der Linde 
1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC), which was the second decision on 
equality and which illustrates the court's interpretation of the 
equality clause in much greater detail.
DISCRIMINATION AND HUMAN DIGNITY
The Prinsloo case related to the Forest Control Act 1984, which 
has as one of its principal objectives the prevention and control 
of veld and forest fires. In order to achieve this it creates various 
fire control areas where schemes of compulsory fire control are 
established, with special emphasis on the clearing and
maintenance of fire belts between neighbouring properties. A 
number of provisions prescribe criminal penalties for 
landowners in fire control areas who fail to fulfil their statutory 
obligations. Landowners in areas outside of such fire control 
areas are, on the other hand, encouraged but not required to 
embark on similar fire control measures. However, according to 
s. 84 of the Act:
'when in any action by virtue of this Act or the Common Law the 
question of negligence in respect of a veld fire which occurred on land 
situated outside afire control areas arises, negligence is presumed, until 
the contrary is proved'.
Action had been instituted by the first respondent as a result 
of damage allegedly caused to his farmlands by the spread of a 
fire from the neighbouring land of the applicant. The fire 
occurred outside a fire control area. The Transvaal Provincial 
Division of the Supreme Court (as it was then called) referred 
the matter to the court, in order to clarify whether the 
presumption of negligence might (inter alia) violate the right to 
equality in s. 8 of the interim constitution, since the 
presumption applies only in respect of fires in non-controlled 
areas, and not to those spreading in controlled areas.
In this decision the court developed an unfair discrimination 
test which has also been applied in subsequent cases. In 
summary (taken from Harksen v Lane NO 1997 (1) SA 300 (CC), 
para. 53), the first question to be asked is whether the provision 
in question differentiates between people or categories of 
people. If so, it has to be asked whether the differentiation bears 
a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose. If it 
does not, then there is a violation of s. 8(1). If it does have a 
rational basis, it would not violate s. 8(1), but it might 
nonetheless violate s. 8(2).
Two-stage analysis
In order to establish whether there has been a contravention 
of s. 8(2), a two-stage analysis is required. Firstly, it has to be 
established whether the 'differentiation' would amount to 
'discrimination'. This would be established if the differentiation 
resulted from one of the specified grounds. If it is not on a 
specified ground, then whether or not there is discrimination 
will depend on whether the ground is based on attributes and 
characteristics which have the potential to impair the 
fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to 
affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.
The second stage of the analysis requires a decision on 
whether the discrimination would amount to 'unfair 
discrimination'. If it is found to have been on a specified 
ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an unspecified 
ground, unfairness will have to be established by theo J
complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the 
impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in 
his or her situation. To determine whether the impact was unfair 
it is necessary to look, not only at the group who has been 
disadvantaged, but at the nature of the power in terms of which 
the discrimination was effected, and also at the nature of the 
interests which have been affected by the discrimination. If, at 
the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found 
not to be unfair then there will be no violation of s. 8(2). If the 
discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will 
have to be made as to whether the provision can be justified 
under the limitations clause (s. 33(1)). 29
Differentiation v discrimination
Several aspects of the court's approach could be criticised 
(see, for example, criticism of the relation between s. 8 and the 
limitation clause in I M Rautenbach, 'Die verband tussen die 
gelykheidsbeginsel en die algemene beperkingsbepaling in die 
handves van regte'   Prinsloo v Van der Linde en President P^A v 
Hugo\ Journal of South African Law (1997) 571). However this 
author will only address the issue of equating discrimination 
with 'measures that impair the fundamental human dignity of 
persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a 
comparably serious manner'. The court justified this equation as 
follows:
'The proscribed activity is not stated to be 'unfair differentiation' but 
is stated to be 'unfair discrimination'. Given the history of the 
country we are of the view the 'discrimination' has acquired a 
particular pejorative meaning relating to the unequal treatment of 
people based on attributes and characteristics attaching to them. We 
are emerging from a period of our history during which the humanity 
of the majority of the inhabitants of this country was denied. They 
were treated as not having inherent worth, as objects whose identities 
could be arbitrarily defined by those in power rather than as persons 
of infinite worth. In short, they were denied recognition oj their 
inherent dignity. Although one thinks in the first instance of 
discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin one should never lose 
sight in any historical evaluation of other forms of discrimination 
such as that which has taken place on the grounds of sex and gender. 
In our view, unfair discrimination, when used in this second form in 
s. 8(2), in the context ofs. 8 as a whole, principally means treating 
persons differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity 
as human beings, who are inherently equal in dignity.'
Once again it must be emphasised that the court has a 
particular responsibility to sanction these grave forms of 
discrimination. However this may not imply that discriminatory 
measures which do not amount to a violation of human dignity, 
but are nonetheless unjustified and unproportional, may be 
discarded as 'unfair differentiation'. Unfortunately this is exactly 
the message that was conveyed in the Prinsloo decision. The courto J
opined that the differentiation in s. 84 of the Forest Control Act 
between owners and occupiers of land in fire control areas and 
those outside of these areas, and the respective burdens and 
obligations accompanying this differentiation, cannot:
'by any stretch oj the imagination, be seen as impairing the dignity 
of the owner or occupier oj land outside thejire control area.' 
(para. 41)
The court should have evaluated the impact of these 
differentiating measures (in particular the presumption of 
negligence) independently from the question as to whether their 
human dignity was violated. In other words, the latter question 
is superfluous   as is the distinction between unfair 
differentiation and unfair discrimination. Once it wras 
established that s. 84 differentiates between people or categories 
of people, the court should have proceeded with the question 
whether this differentiation would be unfair, in the light of its' o
impact on the group in question (since these measures do not 
relate to one of the specified grounds, the unfairness cannot be 
presumed and must be proved). By first asking whether the 
discriminatory measures could impair the fundamental dignity 
of those affected, the court erected an additional, artificial and 
difficult barrier which effectively prevented it from dealing with 
the real issue at hand.
The same criticism applies to the subsequent decision of 
Harksen v Lane NO. The court had to decide whether certain 
provisions of the Insolvency Act 1936 violated the equality clause. 
According to s. 21 of the Act, the sequestration of the estate of 
one of the two spouses has the effect of vesting in the master or 
trustee, the property of the spouse (which includes a live-in 
partner for the purposes of the Act) whose estate has not been 
sequestrated. It was contended that the vesting provision 
constitutes unequal treatment of solvent spouses and 
discriminates unfairly against them. It imposes severe burdens 
on them beyond those applicable to other persons with whom 
the insolvent had dealings or close relationship, or whose 
property' is found in the possession of the insolvent.
Relying on the test developed in the Prinsloo decision, the 
court submitted that the differentiation does arise from the 
complainant's attributes or characteristics as solvent spouses, 
namely their close relationship with the insolvent spouse and the 
fact that they usually live together as a household. According to 
the court these attributes have the potential to demean persons 
in their human dignity. However it also submitted that the 
solvent spouses are not a vulnerable group which has suffered 
discrimination in the past (Harksen decision, para. 70). The 
majority of the court then concluded that the inconvenience and 
potential prejudice that could result for the solvent spouses from 
s. 21 do not lead to an impairment of fundamental dignity or 
constitute an impairment of a comparably serious nature 
(Harksen decision, para. 63).
It may well be that the fundamental dignity of the solvent 
spouses is not affected by the disputed provision; one might 
even question the court's assumption that the particular 
attributes of solvent spouses have the potential to demean their 
human dignity. Nonetheless, this does not explain whether it is 
justified that the spouse of the insolvent is treated differently 
from other people closely associated with the insolvent and with 
whom the latter could also collude at the expense of creditors. 
The core issue thus remained unanswered.
TEACHERS AND EQUALITY
In the decision of Larbi-Odam v MECfor Education (North West 
Province), it was claimed successfully that a provincial regulation 
restricting foreign teachers with permanent residence permits 
for South Africa from applying for certain permanent teaching 
posts, violated the equality clause. The court identified the 
permanent residents as a vulnerable group, being a minority 
with little political muscle. Furthermore, the disputed 
governmental regulation was discriminatory, as it was based on 
attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair 
their fundamental dignity (para. 20). Since the impact of the 
regulations would be to cause great insecurity among people 
who have been granted the right to remain in the country 
permanently, and who are generally entitled to compete with 
South Africans in the employment market, the discrimination
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was also seen to be unfair. It could not be justified in terms of 
the limitation clause, since the aim of the provincial 
government to reduce unemployment among South African 
teachers at the expense of permanent residents would be 
illegitimate (Larbi-Odam decision, para. 31).
Although the outcome of the decision is to be welcomed, one 
might ask what the fate of the permanent residents would have 
been, had they not been perceived as a vulnerable group whose 
fundamental dignity might be at stake. Had they not passed this 
hurdle, the impact of the regulation on their interests and the 
idiosyncrasy of granting people permanent residency and then 
excluding them from the employment market, might not have 
been considered at all.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the main criticism against the historical 
interpretation followed by the court is that it results in a very 
restrictive concept of equality. Only those categories of persons 
who would qualify as a vulnerable group, or whose fundamental
Hong Kong
dignity could be affected by the discriminatory measures, have a 
realistic chance of succeeding with a claim of unfair 
discrimination. It seems that the court assumes that treating lesso
severe forms of discrimination as 'unfair discrimination' might 
trivialise the severity of the humiliating discrimination suffered 
by the country's black population in the past. Consequently, 
many patterns of less severe but nonetheless unfair treatment 
would be excluded from the protection provided by the equality- 
clause, unless the court develops artificial constructions of 
vulnerable groups, or artificial connections between 
discriminatory measures and the fundamental dignity of those 
affected. The court would be well advised to reconsider this 
interpretation, if it is truly committed to providing extensive 
equal treatment to the members of the South African society. @
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Does legal set-off exist?
by Eugene Fung
I n Re Finbo Engineering Co Ltd (unreported), 18 March 1998, Le Pichon J, the Court of First Instance in Hong Kong was asked whether legal set-off exists in Hong Kong. A petition 
was filed to wind up a company on the ground that it was unable 
to pay its debts and that it was just and equitable that it should 
be wound up. The petition was opposed by the company on the 
ground that it was entitled to a set-off against the debt owed to 
the petitioner.
If the company could show an arguable defence of legal 
set-off, the petition would have to be dismissed. Le Pichon J 
concluded that, given the complexity of the question, the 
company must at least have an arguable defence of legal set-off.
ORIGINS OF LEGAL SET-OFF
A 'set-off has been defined as 'the setting of cross-claims 
against each other to produce a balance' (see R Derham, Set-Off, 
2nd ed, (1996), Oxford, p. 1). Legal set-off has a statutory 
origin: the statutes of set-off were enacted in England in 1729 
and 1735 ('the statutes of set-off). Before the passing of the 
statutes of set-off, a debtor had to bring a separate action in 
order to enforce a debt owed to him by his creditor.
The statutes of set-off were designed to prevent the 
imprisonment as a debtor of a person not truly indebted 
because there was a mutual debt owing by his creditor. The plea 
of set-off under the statutes was available where each of the 
demands sounded in damages and was 'capable of being 
liquidated, or ascertained with precision at the time of 
pleading'(Tindal CJ in Morley v Inglis (1837) 4 Bing (NC) 58 at 
p. 71). (Recently, in Stein v Blake [1996] 1 AC 243 at p. 251, 
Lord Hoffmann similarly said that the 'legal set-off is confined 
to debts which at the time when the defence of set-off is filed 
were due and payable and either liquidated or in sums capable 
of ascertainment without valuation or estimation.')
Moreover, the debtor did not have to bring his cross-claim in 
a separate action. Thus, as Willes CJ thought, the statutes of 
set-off were intended to avoid circuit)' of action (Hutchinson v 
Sturges (1741) Willes 261 at p. 262).
The Supreme Court of Judicature in England was established 
by \hejudicature Act 1873, which expressly allowed the court to 
entertain a counterclaim (s. 24, rule 3). It therefore appears that 
the passing of the Judicature Act 1873 rendered the statutes of 
set-off redundant. Accordingly, the statues of set-off were 
repealed by s. 2 of Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act 1879 and the 
Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act 1883. In each of the 
repealing statutes, there were savings to ensure that the repeal 
would not affect any jurisdiction, principle or rule of law or 
equity which had been established or confirmed by or under 
either of the enactments (Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act 1879, 
s. 4(1 )(b) and the preamble of the Statute Law Revision and Civil 
Procedure Act 1883). The saving provisions have been interpreted 
as preserving the right of set-off originally conferred by the 
statutes of set-off (e.g. Hanak v Green [1958] 2 QB 9 at p. 22 
where Morris LJ said that 'the Judicature Acts conferred no new 
rights of set-off ). It follows that the right to a legal set-off under 
the statutes of set-off had come to be regarded as part of the 
common law of England and Wales at the time when the statutes 
of set-off were repealed.
LEGAL SET-OFF IN HONG KONG
The Supreme Court of Judicature at Hong Kong was 
established by Ordinance No. 15 of 1844 ('the 1884 
Ordinance'). Section 3 of the 1884 Ordinance reads:
'And be it further enacted and ordained, That the Law of England 
shall be in full Force in the said Colony of Hong Kong, except where 
the same shall be inapplicable to the local Circumstances of the said 
Colony, or its Inhabitants: ... Provided also, that in all Matters relating 
to the Practice and Proceedings of the said Supreme Court... the Practice 
of the English Courts shall be in Force, until otherwise ordered by any 
Rule of the said Court. ..'
Le Pichon J said in her judgment that:
'local circumstances would not have made the statutes [of set-off] 
inapplicable or subject to modification. '
Although the 1884 Ordinance was subsequently amended 
several times, the application of the statutes of set-off was not 31
